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“Sharing” Copyrights: The Copyright Implications of User
Content in Social Media
Jessica Gutierrez Alm*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet is a place of open communication and idea
sharing. This both coincides and conflicts with the policy rationales
of copyright law. The primary function of copyright law is “to
promote the progress of science and the useful arts” by providing
creators with economic incentive and security.1 The Internet
promotes collaboration and free expression, and thus advances the
goal of copyright law: creativity. However, the Internet has also
introduced unique problems to copyright jurisprudence. The
unprecedented instant transfer of information allows rapid and
large-scale infringement. Coupled with the Internet’s sharing
atmosphere, this has fostered a generation of users who freely
disregard copyrights. Some of these issues were addressed under
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), which left courts
to sort through a somewhat awkward melding of old law and new
technology. Now, fifteen years after enactment of the DMCA, the
law is still unclear, and the need for new legislation is evident in the
face of the Internet’s expanding applications.2

* Juris Doctor expected, Hamline University School of Law, 2014. The author
would like to thank her husband for his unwavering support; her family for their
encouragement and guidance; and the editors of the Hamline Journal of Public
Law and Policy for their assistance and for affording her this opportunity.
1
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
2
See Julie Nichols Matthews et al., Social Media in the Digital Millennium, 5
LANDSLIDE 26, 26–27 (2013).
When the DMCA was signed into law in 1998, social media was still nascent, as
was much of the World Wide Web. As a result, the legislation could not and did
not take into account the drastic shift in online culture that would occur in the
following 15 years. Today, social medial users, copyright holders, Internet
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One such application is online social media. In recent years,
social media has ingrained itself in popular culture, bringing with it
a multitude of copyright complications. Social media changed the
face of the Internet, and quickly became one of the web’s most
prevalent outlets.3
As a requirement for using social media websites, users
must agree to the websites’ Terms of Use (TOU), which govern the
relationships between users and the sites. These website TOU often
have similar terms that relate to and control the types of content that
individuals may post.
The content that users post can generally be divided into two
categories: user-found content and user-generated content. The
difference lies in where the information originates; a user’s own
creative product is user-generated, but information that a user finds

service providers, and courts continue to wrestle with the consequences of the
system established in simpler times.
Id. Congress has enacted some legislation since the DMCA, but it is aimed
primarily at minor modifications. See, e.g., Copyright Cleanup Clarification and
Correction Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-295, 124 Stat. 3180 (2010) (clarifying
certain phrases within the Copyright Act); Satellite Television Extension and
Localism Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-175, 124 Stat. 1218 (2010) (extending the
length of statutory licenses for satellite carriers). Other enactments have focused
on narrow piracy and enforcement issues. See, e.g., Family Entertainment and
Copyright Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-9, 119 Stat. 218 (2005) (addressing
unauthorized video recording in movie theaters); Prioritizing Resources and
Organization for Intellectual Property Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-403, 122
Stat. 4256 (2008) (enhancing certain criminal and civil remedies, improving
funding for enforcement, and creating the Intellectual Property Enforcement
Coordinator position); see Maria A. Pallante, The Next Great Copyright Act, 36
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 315, 319–20 (2013) (discussing the current need for new
comprehensive copyright legislation).
3
Ylan Q. Mui & Peter Whoriskey, Facebook Passes Google as Most Popular
Site on the Internet, Two Measures Show, WASH. POST (Dec. 31, 2010, 12:00
AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/
2010/12/30/AR2010123004645.html (stating that Facebook surpassed Google in
Internet traffic); Sarah Kessler, Americans Spend 23% of Internet Time on Social
Networks, MASHABLE (Sept. 12, 2011), http://mashable.com/
2011/09/12/23-percent-online (reporting that social media is the most frequent
use of the Internet).
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elsewhere on the Internet and reposts or forwards on to others is
user-found.4 Early social media leaders like Facebook, YouTube,
and Twitter originally focused on user-generated content by
offering platforms where users could post images, videos, and
writings they create. Much of this user-generated content may be
copyrightable, but by simply posting it online, users transfer broad
rights to social media companies through the sites’ TOU. This
leaves users with little bargaining power and questionable
ownership rights in their own content.
A recent shift in social media platforms led to what some
refer to as “second-generation” social media.5 The secondgeneration platforms entered the market following the success of
forerunners like Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter.6 Secondgeneration websites distinguish themselves by relying on the
proliferation of user-found content, whereas the first generation
relied primarily on user-generated content.7 Copyright problems
may arise when a user posts found content that is actually someone
else’s creative content. In the absence of clear legal standards, this
has become a common and encouraged practice on the Internet.
Historically, innovation has always challenged copyright
law.8 Inevitably, the legal implications surrounding new
4

See Craig C. Carpenter, Copyright Infringement and the Second Generation of
Social Media: Why Pinterest Users Should be Protected from Copyright
Infringement by the Fair Use Defense, 16 No. 7 J. INTERNET L. 1, 10 (2013).
5
Id.
6
Id.
7
Id.
8
Technological innovations threaten copyright law by revolutionizing the ability
to copy and distribute. See, e.g., White-Smith Music Pub. Co. v. Apollo Co., 209
U.S. 1 (1908) (assignee of copyrights on music compositions brought suit against
player piano sellers); Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392
U.S. 390 (1968) (owners of copyrights on motion pictures brought suit against
television rebroadcasting company); Sony v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S.
417 (1984) (owners of copyrights on television programs brought suit against
manufacturers of videotape recorders). See generally Vincent J. Roccia, What’s
Fair is (Not Always) Fair on the Internet, 29 RUTGERS L.J. 155, 163–64 (1997)
(discussing copyright law’s response to such technologies as the VCR,
photocopier, and tape recorder); Sony, 464 U.S. at 430–31 (“From its beginning,
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technologies are at first unclear, and potentially infringing conduct
becomes commonplace before courts or legislatures have the
opportunity to address it. This can be seen through the recent
example of online file sharing in the early 2000s.9 Illegal Internet
file sharing became popular among millions of users before
copyright holders brought massive waves of lawsuits against
individual users and software providers.10 Similarly, sharing and
linking to copyrighted user-found content has become an accepted
Internet practice, with unclear copyright implications among users.
One recent platform that saw rapid success after its launch,
Pinterest, relies almost exclusively on user-found content.11 As
copyright law struggles to catch up to these new challenges, users
are left only with the guidance of convoluted website TOU.
This article examines the copyright implications of both
user-generated and user-found content posted to social media
websites, and how the websites’ TOU affect copyrights in user
content. Part II looks first to the copyrightability of user-generated
content, and then to the broad copyright license that social media
TOU impose on users. Part III discusses the rising culture of userfound content, the apparent conflict with website TOU, and the
infringement issues that may arise with linking to others’ content,
including possible defenses.
II. USER-GENERATED CONTENT
User-generated content consists of the text, images, and
videos that social media users independently create and post
online.12 Much of this product is likely copyrightable.

the law of copyright has developed in response to significant changes in
technology. Indeed, it was the invention of . . . the printing press that gave rise to
the original need for copyright protection.” (citations omitted)).
9
See, e.g., A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001);
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios v. Grokster, 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
10
Mohsen Manesh, The Immorality of Theft, the Amorality of Infringement,
2006 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 5, 34–35 (2006).
11
See infra Section III.C.
12
Carpenter, supra note 4, at 10.
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A. Copyrightability
The 1976 Copyright Act (“Copyright Act”) defines
copyrightable material as “original works of authorship fixed in any
tangible medium of expression.”13 Section 102 further defines
“works of authorship” to include a list of eight categories, though
the list is non-exhaustive.14 To determine copyrightability, courts
look to whether a work is both (1) “original” and (2) “fixed,” rather
than focusing on whether it falls within one of the enumerated
categories of Section 102.15
In defining the first element, originality, the Supreme Court
stated the work must be an “independent creation” that exhibits a
“modicum of creativity.”16 At least some user-generated content
may pass the test of originality. User-generated content, as long as
it is created by the individual user, fits the first requirement of
“independent creation.”17 A user’s status updates, comments, and
self-made videos and photos are all independent creations when
generated by the individual user. However, much of the content on
social media websites will not easily satisfy the modicum of
creativity component.
13

17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012).
Id. This list includes:
literary works;
musical works, including any accompanying works;
dramatic works, including any accompanying music;
pantomimes and choreographic works;
pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works;
motion pictures and other audiovisual works;
sound recordings; and
architectural works.
15
Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int’l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 48 (D. Mass.
1997) (“[T]he designation ‘works of authorship’ is not meant to be limited to
traditional works of authorship such as novels or plays. Rather, Congress used
this phrase to extend copyright to new methods of expression as they evolve.”).
16
Feist Publ’ns v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).
17
See Reader’s Digest Ass’n v. Conservative Digest, Inc., 821 F.2d 800, 806
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (defining “originality” to mean only that “the work is
independently created rather than copied from other works” (citations omitted)).
14
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In addition to being independently created, content must
have a “modicum of creativity” to be deemed original. Although the
threshold for creativity is low, much of the content users post may
not contain the requisite creativity. The Supreme Court specifically
stated that not all photographs hold the creativity to be
copyrightable.18 However, the court indicated that photographs
would likely only need a small degree of composure and
positioning to receive copyright protection.19 The same principles
apply to user-created videos, but status updates and comments are
less likely to receive protection.
The lengths for status updates and comments are sometimes
limited and the majority consists only of short sentences of
conversational words, from which creativity would be hard to find.
Slogans, short phrases, and expressions of common words are
generally not copyrightable because they do not show the necessary
modicum of creativity.20 Although, this does not mean that a written
work has to fit a certain length before courts will find creativity.
Poems, for example, qualify for copyright protection due to

18

Burrow Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 59 (1884).
Id. at 61. In holding that a photograph of Oscar Wilde was copyrightable, the
court noted the photographer’s creativity seen through positioning the subject,
arrangement of “costume, draperies, and other various accessories,” and
“arranging and disposing the light and shade.” Id. at 60. The court stated that not
all photographs may be copyrightable, because many may simply be “the mere
mechanical reproduction of the physical features or outlines of some object
animate or inanimate, and involve[] no originality of thought or any novelty in
the intellectual operation connected with its visible reproduction in shape of a
picture.” Id. at 58–59. See also Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 307 (2d Cir.
1992) (holding that the photographer’s “inventive efforts” in posing subjects of
the photograph met the requisite element of creativity); Mannion v. Coors
Brewing Co., 377 F. Supp. 2d 444, 455 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (holding that the
photographer’s unusual angle, distinctive lighting, composition, and wardrobe
instructions evidenced originality, rendering a photograph of a young man
wearing a white t-shirt and a large amount of jewelry copyrightable).
20
Kitchens of Sara Lee, Inc. v. Nifty Foods Corp., 266 F.2d 541, 544 (2d Cir.
1959). See also Jean v. Bug Music, Inc., No. 00-4022, 2002 WL 287786, at *6
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 2002) (holding that the lyrical phrase “clap your hands” is not
copyrightable because it is a common phrase).
19
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creativity in the arrangement of the words.21 There are great works,
of which copyright protection is unquestioned, that would fit
comfortably within Twitter’s 140-character limit.22 Accordingly,
some status updates and comments will surely meet the creativity
threshold of originality.
In addition to the element of originality, works must also be
fixed in a tangible form in order to receive copyright protection.
The Copyright Act defines “fixed” as an expression in which a
work may be “perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated
for a period of more than transitory duration.”23 The analysis of
whether a work is sufficiently fixed for more than a transitory
period is a fact-specific one,24 but some technological cases shed
light on what courts may deem “fixed.”25 In Cartoon Network, a
court held that Internet data that existed for only 1.2 seconds before
it was automatically rewritten was transitory and not fixed.26 In
MAI Systems, however, a court held that RAM, a computer’s
temporary memory that is erased upon shut down, is fixed in a
tangible form.27 In general, the content posted on social media
websites is not automatically deleted or overwritten. It remains

21

See Rebecca Haas, Twitter: New Challenges to Copyright Law in the Internet
Age, 10 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 231, 243 (2010) (citing Becker v.
Loew’s, Inc., 133 F.2d 889, 891 (7th Cir. 1943)). However, protection in the
poem as a whole does not afford copyright protection to the individual words.
Becker, 133 F.2d at 891.
22
See generally George Wei, Certainty of Subject-Matter in the Development of
Intellectual Property: “Please Sir, I Want Some More!” 2009 SING. J. LEGAL
STUD. 474, 502 n.58 (2009) (stating “[n]o doubt Haiku poems can be protected as
original literary works applying basic copyright principles.”).
23
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
24
See Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 130 (2d
Cir. 2008).
25
See, e.g., id.; MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 518 (9th
Cir. 1993).
26
Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 130.
27
Advanced Computer Servs. of Mich., Inc. v. MAI Sys. Corp., 845 F. Supp.
356, 362–63 (E.D. Va. 1994) (“Although the contents of RAM are, in some
respects, ephemeral or transient, it is important to remember that the Act does not
require absolute permanence.”).
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stored, visible, and searchable. User-generated content is unlike the
transitory information in Cartoon Network, and is even more
permanent than the RAM memory in MAI Systems. A court would
likely find social media content to be fixed in tangible form.
Therefore, for those works that also meet the originality
requirement, this renders at least some user-generated content
copyrightable material.
When an original work of authorship is fixed in a tangible
form, the author is granted six exclusive rights of ownership. These
include the rights to: reproduce, prepare derivative works, distribute
copies, perform audiovisual works publicly, perform sound
recordings publicly, and display publicly.28 For those usergenerated works that are copyrightable, the act of fixation grants
copyright protection for all six rights to the owner.29 However,
when the act of fixation occurs on a social media outlet, broad
website TOU may automatically alter the author’s rights.
B. Terms of Use and Licensing User Rights
Social media platforms function by distributing user content
to other users. In order not to infringe users’ copyrights, social
media website TOU require the users to license the rights to their
content. Agreement to the TOU is usually accomplished when the
user clicks “agree” at the bottom of a page of dense text. This type
of online contract formation, known as a “click-wrap” agreement,30

28

17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012).
The Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988 did away with the
formalities that authors had to comply with under earlier acts in order to receive
copyright protection. Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No.
100–568, 102 Stat. 2853 (1988). Formalities required for copyright protection
under prior laws included publication of the work, notice of copyright date and
ownership, registration with the Copyright Office, and deposit of copies with the
Library of Congress. See generally Jane C. Ginsburg, The U.S. Experience with
Mandatory Copyright Formalities: A Love/Hate Relationship, 33 COLUM. J.L. &
ARTS 311 (2010).
30
A click-wrap agreement is defined as:
29
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is usually upheld, because the act of clicking “agree” notifies the
user of the terms and requires assent.31 The TOU of Facebook,
Twitter, YouTube, Instagram, and Pinterest each state that the user
retains the rights to any user-generated content.32 However, each
platform then requires the user to agree to an extremely broad nonexclusive license. Facebook, for example, states that the user grants
a “non-exclusive, transferable, sub-licensable, royalty-free,
worldwide license to use any IP content that you post on or in
connection with Facebook.”33 YouTube, Pinterest, and Twitter go
further and state that the license permits the company specific
rights.34 YouTube’s license, for example, permits it to “reproduce,
distribute, prepare derivative works of, display, and perform” user
[An] agreement [that] appears when a user first installs computer software
obtained from an online source or attempts to conduct an Internet transaction
involving the agreement, and purports to condition further access to the software
or transaction on the user's consent to certain conditions there specified; the user
“consents” to these conditions by “clicking” on a dialog box on the screen, which
then proceeds with the remainder of the software installation or Internet
transaction.
Kevin W. Grierson, Enforceability of “Clickwrap” or “Shrinkwrap” Agreements
Common in Computer Software, Hardware, and Internet Transactions, 106
A.L.R.5th 309, 317 n.1 (2003).
31
See Sharon K. Sandeen, The Sense and Nonsense of Web Site Terms of Use
Agreements, 26 HAMLINE L. REV. 499, 547 (2003); Nathan J. Davis, Presumed
Assent: The Judicial Acceptance of Clickwrap, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577, 579
(2007).
32
See Facebook, Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, https://www.
facebook.com/legal/terms (last visited Nov. 27, 2013) (“You own all of the
content and information you post on Facebook.”); YouTube, Terms of Service,
http://www.YouTube.com/t/terms (last visited Nov. 27, 2013) (“You retain all of
your ownership rights in your Content.”); Pinterest, Terms of Service,
http://about.pinterest.com/terms/ (last visited Nov. 27, 2013) (“You retain all
rights in . . . the User Content you post.”); Twitter, Terms of Service,
https://twitter.com/tos (last visited Nov. 27, 2013) (“You retain your rights to any
Content you submit, post or display.”); Instagram, Terms of Use,
http://instagram.com/about/legal/terms/ (last visited Nov. 27, 2013) (“Instagram
does not claim ownership of any Content that you post.”).
33
Facebook, Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, supra note 32.
34
YouTube, Terms of Service, supra note 32; Pinterest, Terms of Service, supra
note 32; Twitter, Terms of Service, supra note 32.
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content.35 This carefully drafted language licenses to Youtube all
six of the copyright owner’s exclusive rights granted by the
Copyright Act, along with the right to sub-license all six rights.36
These licenses are non-exclusive, and therefore do not transfer
ownership.37 However, the licenses are so broad that they permit the
websites to do nearly anything with user-generated content,
questioning what rights the user has in the face of such licenses.
Although some sites such as Pinterest detail specific uses for
user content in their TOU,38 other sites like Instagram have only
vague language such as a “license to use the Content that you
post.”39 This ambiguous language does not state how users’ content
will be exploited. Facebook’s terms present similar vagueness: a
“license to use any IP content that you post.”40 Facebook’s TOU do
not define “use,” leaving an ill-defined license of unknown limits.
As one commentator noted, Facebook could “surreptitiously
sublicense user content to porno.com” and “this would fall squarely
35

YouTube, Terms of Service, supra note 32. Pinterest and Twitter, however,
license themselves rights that are not defined under copyright law, but are
specific to the services. See Twitter, Terms of Service, supra note 32 (licensing
the rights to “process, adapt, modify . . . [and] transmit” user content); Pinterest,
Terms of Service, supra note 32 (licensing the right to “re-pin” user content). It is
difficult to determine where these rights fit within copyright law. For example, in
Pinterest, the right to “re-pin” would seem to simply include the collective rights
to copy and distribute, rights that are also included in Pinterest’s terms, creating a
duplicative effect. In Twitter’s TOU, the right to “process” is even more difficult
to square with the Copyright Act’s six exclusive rights. This seems somewhat of
an illusory right.
36
See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012) (granting to copyright owners the rights to
reproduce, prepare derivative works, distribute, perform (audiovisual works)
publicly, perform (sound recordings) publicly, and display publicly). YouTube’s
language parallels the statutory grant of rights.
37
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (defining a “transfer of copyright ownership” to
include exclusive licenses, but not nonexclusive licenses).
38
Pinterest, Terms of Service, supra note 32 (licensing user content to Pinterest
“solely for the purposes of operating, developing, providing, and using the
Pinterest Products”).
39
Instagram, Terms of Use, supra note 32.
40
Facebook, Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, supra note 32) (emphasis
added).
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within the license Facebook purports to be granted by users.”41 The
majority of users would likely be surprised to learn that they have
licensed such broad latitude with their user-generated content.
However, the licenses are often so vaguely defined that they may
actually be unenforceable.
For example, in Cohen, plaintiffs alleged that Facebook
misappropriated their names and likenesses for commercial
purposes.42 The court found that, while users may have consented to
Facebook’s use of their names and pictures, the TOU did not
establish consent for Facebook to disclose what online services they
had utilized or to endorse those services with the names and
pictures.43 The court went on to discuss that Facebook’s TOU did
not provide a blanket license to exploit user content for any
purpose: “Presumably, Facebook would not argue that its supposed
license to use profile pictures ‘in any manner’ would insulate it
from defamation claims were it to post the names and pictures of
the named plaintiffs on every user’s Facebook home page, over a
caption reading, ‘the FBI’s Most Wanted.’”44
Facebook’s and other sites’ TOU may also be challengeable
because, although the licenses purport to terminate when the user
deletes her account, many of the licenses also incorporate an
inconsistent grant of continued use. Facebook’s terms, for example,
state “this IP License ends when you delete your IP content on your
account unless your content has been shared with others, and they
have not deleted it.”45 Although Facebook expressly states that its
license ends when a user terminates his account, the second half of
41

Steven Hetcher, User-Generated Content and the Future of Copyright: Part
Two—Agreements Between Users and Mega-Sites, 24 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER
& HIGH TECH. L.J. 829, 848 (2008).
42
Cohen v. Facebook, Inc., 798 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1092 (N.D. Cal 2011).
43
Id. at 1095–96.
44
Id. at 1096; see also Fraley v. Facebook, Inc., 830 F. Supp. 2d 785, 805–06
(N.D. Cal. 2011) (holding that it was a question of fact whether plaintiffsFacebook users consented to have their names and likenesses used in Facebook’s
“sponsored story” advertisements).
45
Facebook, Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, supra note 32 (emphasis
added).
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the same sentence is contradictory. The attraction of Facebook (and
other social media sites) is in “sharing” content with other users.46
Thus, although Facebook claims to end its license, the fact that
hundreds or thousands of shared copies may persist within
Facebook’s site suggests that the license does not ever terminate.
This inconsistency questions the nature of Facebook’s nonexclusive license and may render the license difficult to interpret
and enforce.
While not all user-generated content is copyrightable, much
of it may be, and that content is subject to automatic, extensive
licenses as soon as it is posted. While these terms may not impact
many users, they could have major implications for artists or
authors who post their works on their social media profiles.
According to the TOU, there is nothing stopping social media
companies from selling copies of a user-photographer’s photos, for
example, or placing them in advertisements. While the TOU may be
unenforceable in some aspects for vagueness or broadness, they do
aver to follow the Copyright Act, and leave the user with little
bargaining power or remedies for her rights. Thus, social media
licenses for user-generated content exemplify the problematic
juxtaposition of technology with existing copyright law,
demonstrating the need for new legislation.
III. USER-FOUND CONTENT
An array of copyright issues also arises with user-found
content on social media. The second-generation of social media
platforms includes both a shift among first-generation platforms,
such as Facebook and Twitter, as well as a series of start-up sites
that rely almost exclusively on user-found content. Through
policies and operations, second-generation social media sites
encourage users to post content that is not their own. Users are
encouraged to post content created by other users or from different

46

See infra Part III.
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websites altogether: a practice often referred to as “linking”.47
Facebook permits this linking activity through “sharing” of user
posts or outside content, Twitter accomplishes it through allowing
“retweets” of user posts, and Pinterest allows users to “pin” content
from other websites.48 However, the social media sites’ actions of
encouraging such content squarely contradict their TOU.49
A. Infringement through Linking
There are two possible avenues of infringement by userfound content: (1) sharing someone else’s original content, and (2)
sharing content that is already infringing. A user may first be
directly liable for infringing the exclusive rights of reproduction,
distribution, and display or performance when sharing content
created by others. For example, retweeting a copyrightable tweet, a
poem perhaps, may leave the retweeter open to liability. The
retweet copies the original by reposting the poem (in the same
tangible form as the original), consequently violating the
reproduction right.50 Infringement of the right of reproduction
requires a showing of two elements: copying and
misappropriation.51 Misappropriation is present when copying goes
so far as to constitute improper appropriation, and is easily met
when the entire work is copied.52 In the case of retweeting, both
47

See generally Jean G. Vidal Font, Sharing Media on Social Networks:
Infringement by Linking?, 3 NO. 2 U. P.R. BUS. L.J. 255 (2012) (discussing thirdparty liability attributable to users who link to others’ content). “This [userfound] content includes, but is not limited to, Internet links, videos, web pages,
photos, and any other content that a user can find on the Internet.” Id. at 256.
48
Facebook, Links: Sharing Links, https://www.facebook.com/
help/335697046510763/ (last visited Nov. 27, 2013); Twitter, FAQs About
Retweets, https://support.twitter.com/groups/31-twitter-basics/topics/109-tweetsmessages/articles/77606-what-is-retweet-rt# (last visited Nov. 27, 2013);
Pinterest, Pinterest Basics, http://about.pinterest.com/basics/ (last visited Nov. 27,
2013).
49
See Carpenter, supra note 4, at 10.
50
See 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (2012).
51
See Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946).
52
See id.
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elements are present because other users can see that the retweeter
plainly copied the entire original from its source. The public
distribution and public display rights are likely also violated as the
retweeter has now made the poem available to all of the user’s
online friends without authorization.53 Violation of the display and
distribution rights requires a public audience, which the Copyright
Act defines as “a substantial number of persons outside of a normal
circle of a family and its social acquaintances.”54 With the average
number of Twitter “followers” (i.e. friends who can see posts) at
208, the public audience standard is likely met.55
Similarly, users may also share others’ copyrighted content
from outside websites. If a user posts a link to an online news story,
for example, a thumbnail-sized photo from the story is displayed,
along with hidden Hypertext Markup Language (HTML)
instructions that link to the original story. When the user clicks on
the link, the HTML instructions direct the user to the original
source of the image. This process of displaying a thumbnail image
from another website and using HTML instructions directing users
53

See 17 U.S.C. § 106(3)–(6) (2012).
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
To perform or display a work “publicly” means—
(1) to perform or display it at a place open to the public or at any place where a
substantial number of persons outside of a normal circle of a family and its social
acquaintances is gathered; or
(2) to transmit or otherwise communicate a performance or display of the work to
a place specified by clause (1) or to the public, by means of any device or
process, whether the members of the public capable of receiving the performance
or display receive it in the same place or in separate places and at the same time
or at different times.
Id. (emphasis added). This definition encompasses public display and
performances via computer.
55
An Exhaustive Study of Twitter Users Across the World, BEEVOLVE (Oct. 10,
2012), http://www.beevolve.com/
twitter-statistics. See also Lars Backstrom, Anatomy of Facebook, FACEBOOK
(Nov. 21, 2011), https://www.facebook.com/notes/facebook-data-team/anatomyof-facebook/10150388519243859 (finding that the average number of Facebook
friends is 190); Sudip Mittal et al., The Pin-Bang Theory: Discovering the
Pinterest World, (July 18, 2013), http://arxiv.org/pdf/1307.4952v1.pdf (finding
that the average number of Pinterest followers is 176).
54
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to the original is known as “in-line linking.”56 Like the tweeted
poem, the photo from the news story is likely copyrightable. The
thumbnail photo shared by the user, a copy from the original
website, may directly infringe reproduction, distribution, and
display rights, as does the retweeted poem. These actions at least
create a prima facie case of direct copyright infringement.
The second type of infringement that may occur with userfound content is via third-party liability, which may arise when a
user links to content that already constitutes an infringement. For
example, if a Facebook user shares an in-line link to a music video
on YouTube to which the original YouTube poster did not have the
rights, the Facebook user may be contributorily liable. Contributory
liability arises when an individual who has knowledge of infringing
activity “induces, causes or materially contributes to the infringing
conduct of another.”57 As an initial requirement, there must be an
underlying direct infringement by another party before contributory
liability can attach.58 When the user’s friends download or even
view the unauthorized music video, they may be directly infringing
a copyright holder’s rights.59 The Facebook user may then be
contributorily liable if she has knowledge that the video is
infringing, because her act of making it available to her friends
arguably “induces, causes or materially contributes” to their
infringing activity.60
After the Supreme Court’s contributory liability analyses in
Sony and Grokster,61 and the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Perfect
10,62 there are still questions as to the level of knowledge required
56

IP Due Diligence in Corp. Transactions § 8:83 (2013); see Perfect 10, Inc. v.
Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1155–56 (9th Cir. 2007).
57
Perfect 10, 508 F.2d at 1171 (quoting Gershwin Publ’n Corp. v. Columbia
Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971)).
58
A&M Records, 239 F.3d at 1013.
59
Perfect 10, 508 F.3d at 1171.
60
See id. (citations omitted).
61
See Sony, 464 U.S. 417; Grokster, 545 U.S. 913.
62
In 2007, the Ninth Circuit actually decided a trilogy of related cases brought
by Perfect 10. See Perfect 10, 508 F.3d 1146; Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int’s Serv.
Ass’n, 494 F.3d 788 (9th Cir. 2007); Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill, L.L.C., 488 F.3d
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to prove contributory liability, and as to what may constitute
inducement, causation, or material contributions in technology
cases.63 However, if the video or other infringing content is
something that the user should know is not a legal online post—it
was from an unofficial source, for example—the knowledge
requirement is likely met.64 Additionally, the Facebook user’s act of
sharing the video with her friends may be considered “inducing”
infringing activity if her friends further infringe copyrights on the
video. Therefore, not only might the Facebook sharer in this
scenario be directly liable for violating reproduction, distribution,
and performance rights, she would also likely be contributorily
liable for any infringing activity that arises out sharing the video.
Two federal appellate courts recently considered issues of
infringement liability with respect to linking to online content.65 In
Perfect 10 v. Amazon.com, the Ninth Circuit reviewed Perfect 10’s
request for a preliminary injunction against Google based on its
claim that Google infringed Perfect 10’s copyrights to certain

1102 (9th Cir. 2007). All three touched on the issue of contributory liability. In
Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., the court considered Perfect 10’s attempt to
hold Google liable for direct and indirect infringement of Perfect 10’s copyrights
through use of Google’s image search function. 508 F.3d at 1154. The Perfect 10,
Inc. v. Visa Int’l Serv. Ass’n case involved Perfect 10’s attempt to impose
vicarious and contributory liability on financial institutions for processing credit
card payments on websites that sold unauthorized copies of Perfect 10’s images.
494 F.3d at 792. In Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill, L.L.C., the court reviewed Perfect
10’s attempt to hold companies liable for providing web hosting and other
services to allegedly infringing websites. 488 F.3d at 1108. See generally Robert
A. McFarlane, The Ninth Circuit Lands a “Perfect 10” Applying Copyright Law
to the Internet, 38 GOLDEN GATE U. L. Rev. 381 (2008).
63
See David Ludwig, Shooting the Messenger: ISP Liability for Contributory
Copyright Infringement, 2006 B.C. INTELL. PROP. & TECH F. 110701 (2006)
(discussing the varying approaches to contributory liability taken by courts in
recent technology cases).
64
Additionally, some courts have held that constructive knowledge is enough to
satisfy this element. See, e.g., Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n
Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1374 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
65
See Perfect 10, 508 F.3d 1146; Flava Works, Inc. v. Gunter, 689 F.3d 754 (7th
Cir. 2012).
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images.66 The case involved Google’s image search function, which
displays thumbnail images, along with HTML instructions directing
users to the original image, in response to a user’s search queries.67
The Ninth Circuit analyzed the thumbnail images separately from
the HTML in-line link.68 The court held that the thumbnail images
that Google displayed in response to a user’s search queries were
likely direct infringements of Perfect 10’s display right.69 However,
the court also held that Google likely had an adequate fair use
defense to its direct infringement of the copyrighted images.70
Regarding in-line linking, the court held that the process of
in-line linking to an original image through HTML instructions was
not direct infringement.71 The court reasoned that the in-line links
were not copies of the original images “fixed in a tangible medium
of expression,” because they only consisted of HTML instructions
that directed the user to the original image.72 Without a fixed copy,
there could be no infringement. Although Google’s in-line linking
did not directly violate Perfect 10’s copyrights, the court held that
the process may create contributory liability where the links
directed users to already infringing copies on third-party sites.73 The
process of in-line linking was directing more user traffic to the

66

Perfect 10, 508 F.3d at 1154.
Id. at 1155.
68
See id. at 1159–62.
69
Id. at 1160.
70
Id. at 1168; see infra Part III.D.
71
Perfect 10, 508 F.3d at 1160–61.
72
Id.
73
Id. at 1172–73 (“Google could be held contributorily liable if it had
knowledge that infringing Perfect 10 images were available using its search
engine, could take simple measures to prevent further damage to Perfect 10’s
copyrighted works, and failed to take such steps.”); see also Batesville Servs.,
Inc. v. Funeral Depot, Inc., No. 1:02-CV-01011-DFH-TA, 2004 WL 2750253
(S.D. Ind. Nov. 10, 2004) (holding that an issue of fact existed regarding
defendant’s potential direct or contributory liability for creating links to
unauthorized photographs of plaintiff’s products and reproducing thumbnails of
the photographs).
67
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infringing material, which could be inducing, causing or materially
contributing to direct infringements.74
Similarly, in Flava Works, Inc. v. Gunter, the Seventh
Circuit considered whether a website that allows users to post links
to infringing material incurs contributory liability.75 In that case, a
video production company, Flava Works, sued a video
bookmarking website, myVidster, which allowed users to post links
to outside videos.76 Flava argued that the bookmarking website was
contributorily liable for providing links by which viewers could
access infringing copies of Flava’s videos.77 In contrast to the Ninth
Circuit’s decision, the Seventh Circuit Court held that the links to
infringing copies of Flava’s videos did not create contributory
liability.78
The myVidster site was not contributorily liable for
infringing the right of reproduction because the conduct that
myVidster induced—watching copyrighted material without paying
for it—was not infringing.79 With no underlying infringement, there
could be no contributory liability. After struggling to define the
meaning of “performance” in the Internet context, the court held
that myVidster also did not incur contributory liability for violation
of the performance right.80 Although viewers who clicked on the
link may have violated the performance right, the court held that
myVidster was not significantly contributing to the infringing
activity.81
74

Perfect 10, 508 F.3d at 1172.
Flava Works, 689 F.3d at 757.
76
Id. at 756.
77
Id. at 757–58.
78
Id. at 762.
79
Id. at 757–58 (holding that viewing Flava’s videos for free through the
myVidster site, and thus avoiding Flava’s fees, is the equivalent of “stealing a
copyrighted book from the bookstore and reading it” or “sn[eaking] into a
moving theater and watch[ing] a copyrighted movie without buying a ticket. The
facilitator of conduct that doesn’t infringe copyright is not a contributory
infringer.”).
80
Flava Works, 689 F.3d at 760–62.
81
Id. But see Live Nation Motor Sports, Inc. v. Davis, No. 3:06-CV-276-L, 2007
WL 79311 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 9, 2007) (holding that creating links to a stream of a
75
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Perfect 10 and Flava Works exemplify courts’ difficulty
with applying existing copyright laws to Internet practices.82 The
two outcomes are not easily reconciled, and the Seventh Circuit’s
analysis in Flava Works has been criticized for straying too far from
the Copyright Act.83 In spite of, or perhaps due to, the uncertain
application of the copyright laws to these issues, linking to
copyrighted material on social media platforms persists.
B. Terms of Use Regarding Infringement
While social media practices and policies encourage sharing
and linking with user-found content, the TOU simultaneously
discourage it in a likely attempt to protect the websites from
liability. First, social media TOU require users to own the rights to
all posted content.84 Additionally, the TOU contain language either
live webcast of motor races shown in real time was infringing on the plaintiff’s
public performance right).
82
In wrestling with application of the performance right, the Seventh Circuit
even requested legislative guidance in its opinion: “Legislative clarification of the
public-performance provision of the Copyright Act would therefore be most
welcome.” Flava Works, 689 F.3d at 761.
83
See Copyright Law - Contributory Infringement - Seventh Circuit Holds That Social Bookmarking- of Infringing Content Alone Is Insufficient to Support Grant
of Preliminary Injunction. - Flava Works, Inc. v. Gunter, 689 F.3d, 126 HARV. L.
REV. 2479 (2013).
The Seventh Circuit’s reasoning deviated from the text of the Copyright Act and
focused largely on the motives of allegedly contributory infringers. . . . Even if
one concedes that intent is relevant to the question of contributory infringement,
the Seventh Circuit’s inquiry in Flava remains unconvincing because it neglected
to account adequately for technical advances that have upended the behavior, and
thus the motives, or both providers and consumers of copyrighted content.
Id. at 2485.
84
See Facebook, Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, supra note 32 (“You
own all of the content and information you post on Facebook.”); YouTube,
Terms of Service, supra note 32 (“You affirm, represent, and warrant that you
own or have the necessary licenses, rights, consents, and permissions to publish
Content you submit.”); Twitter, Terms of Service, supra note 32 (“You represent
and warrant that you have all the rights, power and authority necessary to grant
the rights granted herein to any Content that you submit.”); Instagram, Terms of
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requiring users not to infringe others’ copyrights, or at least stating
that accounts may be terminated if users infringe copyrights. For
example, Facebook, YouTube, and Instagram each require users to
agree that they will not post infringing material.85 Conversely,
Twitter’s TOU state that “[the company] respects the intellectual
property rights of others and expects [users] to do the same,”
without any express language requiring users not to infringe
copyrights.86 While this statement does not appear to be more than a
mere suggestion, the site also states that infringing material may be
removed and users’ access may be terminated after repeat
infringements.87 By openly inviting users to disregard copyrights
through the use of linking, while requiring users to agree to TOU
that disallow and condemn the practice, social media websites are
squarely placing liability with the unknowing users.

Use, supra note 32 (“You represent and warrant that: (i) you own the Content
posted by you on or through the Service or otherwise have the right to grant the
rights and licenses set forth in these Terms of Use.”). Until June 2012, Pinterest
had similar language in its TOU. See Kirsten Kowalski, Why I Tearfully Deleted
My Pinterest Inspiration Boards, DDK PORTRAITS BLOG (Feb. 24, 2012),
http://ddkportraits.com/v2/2012/02/why-i-tearfully-deleted-my-pinterestinspiration-boards/ (quoting Pinterest’s earlier TOU as including the phrase “you
either are the sole and exclusive owner of all Member Content that you make
available through the Site, Application and Services, or you have all rights,
license, consents and releases that are necessary.”).
85
Facebook, Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, supra note 32 (“You will
not post content or take any action on Facebook that infringes or violates
someone else’s rights.”); YouTube, Terms of Service, supra note 32 (“Content
you submit to the Service will not contain third party copyrighted material, or
material that is subject to other third party proprietary rights, unless you have
permission.”); Instagram, Terms of Use, supra note 32 (“the posting and use of
your Content on or through the Service does not violate, misappropriate or
infringe on the rights of any third party, including . . . copyrights, trademark,
and/or other intellectual property rights.”).
86
Twitter, Terms of Service, supra note 32.
87
Id.
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C. The Pinterest Problem
The issues of infringement by linking to user-found content
are particularly troublesome with respect to second-generation
social media platforms like Pinterest. Pinterest, launched in 2010
and already boasting 48.7 million users, relies almost exclusively
on user-found content.88 The site allows users to create multiple
pages (“boards”) on which they can “pin” links to material on
outside websites.89 After registering with Pinterest, the user can
install a “pin it” button to the web browser toolbar, allowing the
user to pin virtually any online content.90 Each pin appears on the
user’s board as a thumbnail image, taken from the outside website.
Other Pinterest users can see the pinned images and click on them
to be directed to the outside websites via an in-line link.91 Pinterest
pins create the same issues of direct and contributory liability seen
with retweeting, Facebook sharing, and other methods of linking
material, primarily due to the copied thumbnail images and in-line
linking. However, the level of infringement associated with
Pinterest is greater because the site relies almost exclusively on
users’ willingness for, or ignorance of, infringement. Until April
2012, Pinterest expressly discouraged users from posting their own
content, suggesting that only outside material should be pinned.92
While Pinterest users may now more freely pin user-generated
content, the site still relies primarily on user-found content, and
therefore is likely filled with unauthorized copies of and links to
copyrighted content.
As with other sites that allow user-found content, Pinterest’s
TOU are inconsistent on this point. Pinterest’s TOU reserve the
88

Sarah McBride, Start-up Pinterest Wins New Funding, $2.5 Billion Valuation,
REUTERS (Feb 20, 2013, 8:12 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/21/
net-us-funding-pinterest-idUSBRE91K01R20130221.
89
Pinterest, Pinterest Basics, supra note 48.
90
Id.
91
Id.
92
Kirsten M. Koepsel, Social Networks and the Uneasy Relationship with
Copyright Law, 45 MD. B.J. 20, 29–30 (2012) (discussing Pinterest’s previous
TOU and “Pin Etiquette” policy).
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right to remove infringing content, and in a separate “Acceptable
Use” policy, the site requires users to agree not to pin content they
do not have the right to post.93 After a lawyer blogged about the
inconsistencies in Pinterest’s TOU regarding infringement,
Pinterest received backlash from users, prompting the site to initiate
an “opt-out” policy whereby other websites can prevent material on
their websites from being pinned.94 Of course this is inconsistent
with the existing copyright regime; copyright licenses are not
automatic contracts that require opting out.95 Though this displays
an attempt on Pinterest’s part to acknowledge copyright owners’
rights, the site still relies on copyright infringement as a basic
premise, apparently placing all liability on users.96
D. Defenses
Social media websites’ conflicting TOU and policies
regarding infringement by linking leave users open to substantial
liability, both for direct and third-party infringement. The websites
invite and encourage infringing activity from their users, leaving
users to believe that their actions are legal, or at the very least
shielded by the websites. The sites claim protection for themselves
through indemnity terms and under the safe harbor provision of the
DMCA.97 The DMCA’s safe harbor provision protects “innocent”
93

Pinterest, Terms of Service, supra note 32; Pinterest, Acceptable Use Policy,
http://about.pinterest.com/use// (last visited Nov. 27, 2013).
94
Tia Fisher, Pinterest – Are The New Terms Better? The Legal View, SOCIAL
MEDIA TODAY (March 29, 2012), http://socialmediatoday.com/emoderation/
480219/pinterest-are-new-terms-better-legal-view. See Kowalski, supra note 84.
95
17 U.S.C. §§ 201(d), 204 (2012).
96
See generally Julie Nichols Matthews et al., supra note 2, at 29 (discussing the
copyright infringement issues associated with Pinterest).
97
See, e.g., Facebook, Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, supra note 32
(indemnify); Facebook, About Intellectual Property, https://www.facebook.com/
help/www/399224883474207 (last visited Nov. 27, 2013) (DMCA notice);
Pinterest, Terms of Service, supra note 32 (indemnify); Pinterest, Copyright,
http://about.pinterest.com/copyright/ (last visited Nov. 27, 2013) (DMCA notice);
YouTube, Terms of Service, supra note 32 (indemnify); YouTube, Copyright
Infringement Notification Basics, http://www.youtube.com/yt/copyright/
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Internet service providers who do not have actual or constructive
knowledge of infringing activities.98 To receive protection and
remain innocent, the service providers must implement a policy for
receiving and complying with complaints of infringement
(“takedown notices”) from copyright holders.99 To comply with a
takedown notice, websites must “remove or disable access to” the
infringing material.100 This protects the sites from the contributory
or vicarious liability they would most likely face due to the constant
infringing activities happening through users’ linking and
sharing.101 Without the DMCA safe harbor provision, Pinterest
would be especially at risk because the entire site may not be
“capable of substantial non-infringing uses.”102 With the safe harbor
provision protecting social media platforms, a copyright holder’s
only redress after his content is shared across the Internet is to sue
the individual users who did the sharing.
There may be some defenses available to social media users
who link to copyrighted material. The Flava Works opinion
suggests that social media users who link to infringing content may
escape contributory liability, because linking is not a significant
contribution to the infringing activity and because other users’ act
of viewing infringing material may not be a direct infringement
itself.103 Additionally, the Perfect 10 case suggests that where the
link consists only of HTML instructions and does not include a
thumbnail image or other copied representation, the user may be
free from direct liability.104 Although the analyses in these cases

copyright-complaint.html (last visited Nov. 27, 2013) (DMCA notice).
ALS Scan, Inc. v. RemarQ Cmtys. Inc., 239 F.3d 619, 625 (4th Cir. 2001)
(citing 17 U.S.C. 512(c)(1) (2012)); see 17 U.S.C. § 512(k)(1) (2012) (defining a
“service provider” to include a broad range of Internet companies).
99
ALS Scan, 239 F.3d at 625; 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (2012).
100
17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii) (2012).
101
See A&M Records, 239 F.3d 1004.
102
Sony, 464 U.S. at 442.
103
See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text (discussing the court’s holding
regarding contributory liability).
104
See supra notes 71-74 and accompanying text (discussing the court’s
treatment of in-line linking).
98
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were factually driven and the law remains unsettled, these cases
may offer defense arguments for social media users who link to
third-party content.
Additionally, the fair use defense may be a possible
argument for social media users who infringe through user-found
content; however the success of the argument is by no means
certain. Fair use is an affirmative defense to infringement that
“permits the use of copyrighted works without the copyright
owner’s consent under certain situations.”105 In Perfect 10, the
Ninth Circuit vacated a preliminary injunction against Google for
its use of unauthorized thumbnail images, finding that fair use may
be an adequate defense to direct liability.106 Fair use, as set forth in
Section 107 of the Copyright Act, requires consideration of four
factors: (1) the purpose and character of the defendant’s use; (2) the
nature of the plaintiff’s copyrighted work; (3) the amount and
substantiality of the original that was used; and (4) the effect of the
defendant’s use upon the plaintiff’s market.107 These factors are not
exclusive, and courts will weigh them together “in light of the
purposes of copyright.”108
The first and fourth factors likely weigh in users’ favor.
When the purpose for using the copyrighted content is not
commercial and where the use is somehow transformative from the
copyright holder’s original use, a fair use argument is strong.109 The
purpose for linking on social media is usually non-commercial and
is transformative, in that the purpose of sharing interesting content
is different than the copyright holder’s purpose for creating and

105

Perfect 10, 508 F.3d at 1163.
Id. at 1168.
107
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
108
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578 (1994).
109
See Sony, 464 U.S. at 449 (stating that a finding of non-commercial use
creates a presumption in favor of fair use); Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d
811, 819 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that a search engine’s use of copyrighted
photographs was transformative because the search engine used the photographs
to “improve access to images on the internet”).
106
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placing it online.110 Additionally, because the use is transformative,
the act of sharing links to copyrighted content likely will not have a
negative effect on the copyright holder’s market.111 If the original
copyright holder’s purpose is to make a profit, the social media
links may actually have a positive effect on the owner’s purpose by
directing additional traffic to the original site.
Conversely, the second and third factors seem to weigh
against a finding of fair use. When the copyrighted work is artistic
in nature, the second factor weighs against fair use.112 The majority
of the works linked to on social media sites, such as photographs
and videos, are likely artistic in nature.113 Finally, fair use is less
likely found where the alleged infringer copies the entire work as a
whole.114 Social media sharing generally requires use of the entire
copyrighted work.115
The four factors are not often weighed equally, making
predictions difficult, but with two factors for and against a finding
of fair use in this case, it would be a risky defense. Clearly, there is
no certain defense that would apply to infringement by user-found
content on social media sites, which further illustrates the need for
new legislation.

110

Cf. Perfect 10, 508 F.3d at 1167 (holding that the transformative nature of
Google’s thumbnail images made the first factor weigh in Google’s favor, despite
any minor commercial aspect).
111
Cf. id. at 1168 (holding that Google’s thumbnail-sized images did not hurt
Perfect 10’s market for full-sized images).
112
See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586 (recognizing that where the copyrighted work
is most creative, fair use is less likely because those works are “closer to the core
of intended copyright protection than others”).
113
Cf. Perfect 10, 508 F.3d at 1167 (holding that although Perfect 10’s images
were artistic in nature, the fact that they were “previously published” left the
second factor weigh only slightly in Perfect 10’s favor).
114
See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1016 (9th Cir. 2001)
(“copying an entire work militates against a finding of fair use” (quotation marks
and citations omitted)).
115
Cf. Perfect 10, 508 F.3d at 1167–68 (holding that although Google copied
Perfect 10’s images in their entirety, complete copying was necessary due to the
nature of a visual image search engine).
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IV. CONCLUSION
Copyright law in America, in its current stage of
development, does not sit well with widespread social media
practices. Users’ authored works are instantly subject to broad
licenses, leaving users without any bargaining power over how their
works are used. Moreover, the second-generation of social media
that incorporates user-found content both encourages and prohibits
copyright infringement. Despite the unfair licenses and rampant
infringement, however, courts have not seen many lawsuits over
copyrights in social media content. This is likely because copyright
owners either enjoy the exposure to their works that social media
provides, or because those who dislike it submit DMCA takedown
notices with which sites quickly comply in order to remain within
the safe harbor provision. With the social media platforms likely
protected under the DMCA safe harbor, liability falls on the social
media users, which leaves copyright owners with the unprofitable
option to sue individual users.116
The manner in which social media is currently functioning
within the parameters of copyright law is precarious, and it may
only be a matter of time before it collapses into lawsuits, similar to
the file-sharing suits of the early 2000s.117 Once again, technology
has outpaced development of the law, and the best way to address

116

See Randal C. Picker, Copyright as Entry Policy: The Case of Digital
Distribution, 47 ANTITRUST BULL. 423, 442 (2002) (“Chasing individual
consumers is time consuming and is a teaspoon solution to an ocean problem . .
.”).
117
See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text (discussing the file sharing
lawsuits); Manesh, supra note 10, at 20–32 (discussing the stages of litigation
that record companies and other copyright owners of sound recordings brought
against different types of peer-to-peer file sharing software companies, and the
waves of lawsuits brought against individual users); see also Sarah McBride &
Ethan Smith, Music Industry to Abandon Mass Suits, WALL ST. J., Dec. 19, 2008,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122966038836021137.html
(discussing
the
recording industry’s plan to end litigation after suing tens of thousands of
individuals for illegally downloading music).
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the copyright implications of social media is through the legislative
process.

